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1. The systemic approach to public law
A leading recent text on British constitutional law, 
having listed a number of measures adopted by the Conserva­
tive and Labour Governments between 1970 and 1977 for the 
furtherance of their economic policies, concluded:
'Potentially some of these developments were of 
considerable constitutional interest; but so 
many of them were influenced by economic and 
political vicissitudes that the most appropriate 
commentator was the journalist.' Cl]
The feeling here expressed, that the writer on public law
matters should deliberately distance himself from the hurly-
burly of economic events and political action and conflict,
and should draw a picture of constitutional and administrative
law which is purified of non-legal, short-run influences, is
one which has commanded wide acceptance in both academic
and practising legal circles in the United Kingdom. pQ There
are good intellectual, pedagogical and professional reasons
underlying this attitude. The absence of any formal and
comprehensive written constitution for the United Kingdom
compels a vigorous effort of systematisation and abstraction
if the constitutionally significant features of a long, and
continuing, political and legal history are to be apprehended




























































































systematic treatment of the constitution will amount to 
no more than an arid textual commentary without reference 
to real life. A more mundane, but equally important con­
sideration is that the lawyer must defend his metier: with
few authoritative texts on which to deploy his recognised 
interpretative skills, he runs the risk, in dwelling too 
long on "economic and political vicissitudes" in his treat­
ment of the constitution, of being mistaken not for a 
journalist but - a worse fate, perhaps - for a political 
scientist. In the result, the mainstream of British writing 
by lawyers about the constitution analyses constitutional 
principles and structures largely to the exclusion of any 
consideration of the activities in which the organs of 
government are engaged or the purposes with which they pursue 
them - an interesting exception being the area of governmental 
activity which bears most directly upon personal liberty, 
the actions of the police. Certainly, innumerable examples 
of the behaviour of constitutional organs are cited, but 
always with the objective of illustrating a confirmation of 
or a change in the constitutional system, rather than the 
legal framework of the particular activity of government 
from which the example is drawn.
The merits of this approach - the distillation of 
a reasonably coherent system of public law out of a sprawling 





























































































setting disadvantages. Constitutions must reflect the 
changing powers and responsibilities of government if they 
are not to risk irrelevance and displacement, whether by 
peaceful or less than peaceful means. One of the strengths, 
it may be argued, of the British constitution is an inherent 
flexibility and responsiveness which makes it unlikely ever 
to uffer the fate of the Constitution of the French Fourth 
Republic; but the practitioner of the systemic approach to 
constitutional law, dismissing the current activities of 
government as
mere ephemeridae, may be slow to appreciate, and reluctant 
to acknowledge, the flexible response of our constitution 
to such facts and events and their consequent potential 
for engendering constitutional changes of continuing importance.
A visible aspect of this approach in the literature 
is an attitude of suspicion towards the very existence of 
governmental power. In general, the emphasis is still placed 
heavily on analysis of the capacity of the law and legal 
institutions to restrain governmental action, rather than 
on the exploration of their ability to further governmental 
purposes. Indeed, the very possibility that law may be 
shaped (or reshaped) more by government policy than policy 
is constrained by existing law seems hard for some to accept: 
administrative law, for one of our leading modern writers, 
has for its only object "to keep the powers of government 
within their legal bounds" and to prevent "powerful engines




























































































of authority" from "running amok".[_3] The more dangerous 
invisible aspect is the failure to see the constitutional 
problems of the present which arise from the constant 
adaptations of the instruments of governmental power and 
action in order to discharge the current range of govern­
mental responsibilities amid the economic and political 
vicissitudes of the hour. I would argue, for example, 
that government's use of its contractual powers to influence 
private and public sector behaviour was a significant con­
stitutional problem long before their deployment in the 
contentious context of pay restraint lifted them to the 
status of a first-rank political issue and won them a place 
in the constitutional law literature. Uj
2. An alternative "policy" approach
Implicit in these criticisms is the idea that a truer 
picture of current constitutional and public law problems 
may be obtained by exploring the material hitherto set to 
one side by the mainstream approach, that is to say, aims 
and activities of government. I do not suggest that such 
an exploration can be a substitute for traditional system­
atic analysis; its role is rather a complementary and 
corrective one. It would start not from constitutional 
principles, but from government policy, and ask what demands 





























































































seeking to achieve its objectives, how those systems respond 
to those demands, and what problems those responses create 
for government and for the citizen. This approach might 
be expected to produce a profile of constitutional problems 
differing, at least in some significant respects, from that 
yielded by the systemic approach of mainstream literature.
One simple and already familiar example that could be docu­
mented in this way is that of government rule-making: un­
resolved problems of Parliamentary control of delegated 
legislation dwindle into insignificance beside those re­
vealed by the government's modern preference for informal 
rule-making.
The problems of such an approach to public law 
scholarship are considerable. How is the vast and shifting 
mass of data to be organised? How is the investigator to 
deal with bewilderingly frequent changes in government policy, 
and in the administrative apparatus used to carry those 
policies into effect? How are baselines to be drawn for 
the observation of trends in government activity? This 
paper seeks to contribute to the study of government policy 
by the public lawyer, by furnishing some elements of
a system for the description and study of policy 
which can be related to the structure of the constitution 
and of the legal system. Such a system should ideally be 




























































































ful governmental activity within a legal framework, and 
within such a country, to the analysis of any field of 
government policy. In the present paper, however, the 
system is elaborated with reference only to the United 
Kingdom.
Moreover, within the sphere of govern­
mental activity in the United Kingdom, the ideas here have been 
worked out in the course of extended study of the economic 
policy of the period since 1945. The argument in the paper 
will be couched in terms of economic policy, will draw 
on the literature of applied economics, and will use illus­
trations from the economic sphere. My view is that the 
same structure should be applicable, perhaps with minor 
modifications, to other fields of policy, but I do not claim 
to have demonstrated that this is so. By itself, however, 
the economic policy area is broad and overlaps substantially 
with other areas of policy, such as social policy and de­
fence policy: conclusions reached through study in this
field may claim some presumptive general validity.
GOVERNMENT POLICY: COMPONENTS, CONTEXT, ACTORS
1. Components
The term "government policy" can be used narrowly, so 




























































































jectives it sets itself and the means it proposes to use 
for attaining them. Alternatively, it may bear a broader 
meaning, and be used to refer to the whole of the purposeful 
activity of government. Such activity forms part of a 
complex process of interaction between government and other 
actors in the national and international social and economic 
environment. In this process government seeks to modify the 
behaviour of those actors by reference to determined object­
ives, which are themselves continually amended in response to 
changing circumstances and to feedback from affected actors. /*5J
This concept of policy as purposeful activity forms 
my starting point. The need is to analyse the activity in a 
way which shows as clearly as possible its relationship with 
legal operations: the making, application, and interpretation
of law. Here I attempt a partial analysis which concentrates 
on the implementation phase of economic policy: the process
of formulation and amendment of policy objectives is not system­
atically discussed. For my present purpose a fruitful line 
of approach is suggested by the analysis originated by Tin­
bergen. i_6] At its core is a clear and rigid distinction between
objectives of policy and instruments of policy. Criticism by
political scientists^lof this ends-means distinction, as not 
reflecting the blurriness of the policy-making process or 
the tendency of politicians to attach electoral and other 
values to instruments as such, without regard for the objectives 
they serve, does not detract from the utility of the approach
as a means for clarifying the role of law in the implementation of 




























































































tools for the mathematical modelling of economic policy 
and the prediction of outcomes, a quest pursued with in­
creasing sophistication by some of his followers. fs] Others, 
like Kirschen,have elaborated Tinbergen's approach as 
a framework for orderly comparison of the policies actually 
pursued by governments of both capitalist and socialist 
countries. In formulating a legallv-relevant analysis of 
economic policy I have drawn heavily on Kirschen, so that 
it may be helpful, in order to avoid confusion, to set out 
first the elements of his system, so that the nature of 
my own adaptations can be clearly seen, jjoj
Kirschen distinguishes, as elements of policy, 
aims, objectives, instruments, and measures. Aims are a 
series of abstract concepts which represent the desirable 
ends of government action: economic welfare, physical
security, equality, liberty, and so on. Objectives are 
"the economic translations of political aims into concepts 
which can be given some quantification", [j 1J In his two 
large collaborative works Kirschen offers rather different 
lists of objectives, but the nature of his concept can be 
adequately conveyed by listing a selection: full employ­
ment; price stability; expansion of production; improve­
ment in the distribution of income and wealth; reduction 
of regional disparities; protection of specific branches 





























































































are pursued, and are grouped into such categories as money 
and credit; budgetary and fiscal; direct controls, such 
as rationing or price controls; and institutional changes, 
such as the nationalisation of an industry. Finally, a 
measure is the use of a particular instrument at a particular 
time in order to promote one or more objectives.
In adopting this taxonomy I use the terms aims, 
objectives, and instruments in the same sense as Kirschen.
Aims are briefly discussed in the next paragraph. The 
concept of objectives allows considerable freedom as to 
the degree of precision with which objectives are specified. 
Most writers on economic policy confine their attention to 
the classical quartet of general macro-economic policy ob­
jectives: full employment, price stability, external balance,
economic growth. [12] The lawyer may, however, find it helpful 
to break down these general ideas into a series of more 
specific objectives to which particular instruments and 
measures can be more certainly related. If he wants to 
analyse policy "areas" such as energy policy, manpower policy, 
and so on, he will need to analyse their content in terms of 
precise objectives in this way. jjij The concept of instruments 
is explored in detail later in this paper, but it should be 
made clear now that the concept is an economic, not a legal 
one. Legal rules and other acts are thus not themselves 





























































































as the acts through which instruments are brought into 
operation. Such acts are usually "legal", in that they 
are recognisable as formal elements of the legal order; 
but they need not necessarily be so. An agricultural sub­
sidy is an instrument; the Act authorising its payment, 
the statutory instrument under which it is administered, 
the making of payment to the farmer (whether analysed as 
contract or as gift), are all (legal) measures. A re­
striction of bank credit is likewise an instrument: the
Bank of England "request" bringing it into effect is a 
measure, but has no formal legal status.
2. Context
The concept of aims is nebulous, but valuable in that 
it reminds us that economic welfare is not the only end 
for which government was created, and prompts the question 
of how we relate to the categories of economic policy the 
means of pursuit of other aims such as equality and liberty. 
There are certain economic objectives whose attainment may 
promote such aims as well as that of economic welfare, but 
it is clear that such "goods" as full employment and price 
stability are neither sufficient nor, some would add, 
necessary to a just and free society. At the level of ob­
jectives, however, it might well be possible to specify 




























































































- 1 1 -
in a given society, and which would represent the political 
or constitutional counterpart of the economic objectives 
detailed by Kirschen. In the United Kingdom, sample ob­
jectives of this type might be formulated as "democratic 
endorsement of public spending and taxation decisions", or 
"performance of (certain) governmental functions within 
a legal framework supervised by an independent judiciary". 
Similarly, one might pursue the parallel further in seeking 
to identify instruments for the achievement of these ob­
jectives, to be found in procedural or substantive consti­
tutional principles which, in the United Kingdom, would 
probably be expressed in the form of constitutional con­
ventions, common law rules, and canons of judicial inter­
pretation .
For the purposes of this discussion I do not think 
it necessary to elaborate fully a parallel structure or 
structures of this type. The important point is to be 
aware that the pursuit of aims other than economic welfare 
engenders values, principles, and rules which bear upon 
governmental choice at all three operative levels of the 
Kirschen classification: choice of economic objectives,
choice of instruments for their achievement, choice of 
measures for the operationalisation of those instruments. 
Many of these values, principles and rules form part of the 
constitutional and legal system. It is the interaction 
between these elements of public law and of economic policy



























































































- 1 2 -
that defines and justifies the public lawyer's interest 
in economic policy, for we may postulate that not only do 
the constitutional and legal systems shape economic policy 
choices, but that the pursuit of economic policy objectives 
may also demand and secure changes in these systems. The 
Kirschen taxonomy provides part of the framework for a 
systematic discussion of these influences.
A related set of ideas that need to be taken into 
account in any development of the Kirschen taxonomy for 
legal purposes are those revolving around the concept 
of a state's "economic order". Such orders may be labelled 
as "laisser faire", "social market", "collectivist",
"corporatist" and so on, terms designed to express fundamental 
orientations of economic activity. In recent years this 
concept has been most intensively developed by German scholars 
of the theory of economic policy, who commonly distinguish 
between "ordering policies", which alter the shape of the 
framework within which economic activity is carried on, and 
"process policies", which operate in the free space within 
that framework . [l4j This space/framework distinction has been 
traced back to the English classical economists, [l5̂ and is 
reflected, in the Tinbergen/Kirschen analysis, in their 
distinctions between "reforms", "qualitative policies" and "quantitative 
policies", and between instruments that do, and do not, make 
"institutional" changes, [j 6j In so far as the economic order 



























































































- 1 3 -
- as is the case in West Germany - the distinction between 
space and framework, ordering policies and process policies, 
institutional and non-institutional instruments, is clearly 
a vital one for public lawyers. In the United Kingdom, 
with its flexible constitution which is largely empty of 
substantive principles, the distinction does not have the 
same normative weight: institutional change is, in legal
terms, as easy to effect as non-institutional change. [17]
Its value lies rather in reminding us, once more, that legal 
rules may operate not only as agents of change ("measures" 
in the Kirschen terminology), but also as constituents of 
the economic framework within which change takes place and 
which may itself be subject to change. The institution 
of property, in the United Kingdom largely defined and 
protected by the common law, is one vital element of such 
a framework. The relevant common law rules cannot be assim­
ilated to any element of Kirschen's taxonomy, but help to 
define the space within which that taxonomy operates. And 
as we shall now see, while they may be changed by the oper­
ation of the economic policy process, this is not their 
only source of development.
3. Actors
Having situated this analysis in its proper context 
it is still necessary to provide a further element of def­
inition, by way of reply to the question: whose economic
policy? Obviously I intend to discuss "the government's"




























































































economic policy, and by this I mean, primarily, the activity 
in this field of the central government, composed of ministers 
of the crown and their departments, co-ordinated by the cab­
inet, guided by the treasury. But even in a unitary and 
centralised State like the United Kingdom, the term "govern­
ment" in such a context is not unequivocal.
In the first place, there exists, at any given moment, 
a diffusion of power among various organs of government. We 
need to take into account both the territorial diffusion of 
power and functions among local authorities, and the functional 
diffusion of power, both to specialist executive organs like 
the public corporations which are responsible for the nation­
alised industries and for certain regulatory and public 
service functions, and to organs outside the executive alto­
gether, such as Parliament and the courts. Within the United 
Kingcbm constitutional context, it is of course true that none 
of these power-holders is in any sense autonomous: Parliament,
in the exercise of its sovereign powers, can at any moment 
withdraw or change their functions or the conditions of their 
exercise, and the massive (though not unlimited) influence 
exercisable by the central executive government over the 
legislative process in Parliament gives it a large measure 
of ultimate control over the activities of all organs of 
government in the United Kingdom. This centralisation of 
ultimate power is not, however, a good reason for treating 
the economic policy activities of all organs of government 
in an undifferentiated way. Even within the framework of




























































































the executive branch of government, local authorities 
and public corporations do not stand in a relationship of 
hierarchical subjection to the departments of central 
government. They are separate legal entities, whose status 
and competences are guaranteed by law (and in the case of 
local authorities, reinforced by their democratic and 
representative character), and which are therefore - at any 
given moment - subject to the control of central government 
only to the extent provided for by the law or secured by 
other means (such as financial dependence) against the back­
ground of the law. Given however that that control is 
frequently considerable, and that the economic importance 
of these institutions is, by some measures, as great as 
that of central government itself, we shall find that the 
manipulation of the behaviour of the whole, or particular 
parts, of the non-central government part of the public 
sector is a frequently employed instrument of policy. To 
define "government" in a broad sense, so as to include the 
whole of the public sector, would be to treat as internal, 
and therefore beyond our concern, these processes of manip­
ulation, and to neglect the importance of the varying degrees 
of legal independence possessed by these bodies, which may 
often make it more appropriate to treat them as subjects, 
rather than executants, of policy.
Different arguments apply in relation to non-executive 
bodies. Parliament, in the British system, should not be 
viewed as the maker or possessor of economic policies. Its




























































































role is rather one of scrutiny, discussion and legitimation 
of policies formed elsewhere. In almost every case, these 
are policies presented by central government as its policies; 
in the formation of such policies groups of members of Par­
liament, or even individual members, may exercise some in­
fluence, but it is clear that in general, Parliament today 
has a less significant influence in the formation of policy 
than do a variety of other bodies, from the political parties 
to the trade unions, employers' organisations, and other 
major interest groups. Occasionally (though with great 
rarity in the field of economic policy) an interest group 
may short-circuit the normal process of policy formation 
and implementation, addressing itself directly to Parliament, 
via sympathetic Members, for the enactment of legal measures 
to secure its policy objectives. Such measures are too rare 
(and given the present balance of constitutional powers in 
the United Kingdom, unobtainable in this way unless the 
government itself adopts an attitude of neutrality or tol­
erance) to warrant treating Parliament's role in economic 
policy as other than an essentially reactive one. [18]
The same cannot be said about the courts. Courts do, 
after all, take decisions with binding effect, not only for 
the individual parties before them but also, through the 
operation of doctrines of judicial authority and precedent, 
for all parties who now or in the future find themselves in 
the same situation. In the civil sphere, the decisions 
are usually reached without the help or intervention of any




























































































other organ of government. Such decisions might, in my 
terminology, be measures, if in arriving at them courts are 
seeking, consciously or even unconsciously, to achieve goals 
in the nature of economic objectives. In developing the 
common law of restraint of trade, for example, the courts 
may be seen as attempting to inhibit, through a judicial 
policy of non-enforcement, the use of contractual devices 
to create or consolidate dominant positions in local and 
other markets. {j 9J More fundamentally, the whole activity 
of the courts in developing and maintaining the principles 
of the common law is viewed, by the economic analysts of 
the Chicago School, as promoting a basic economic ob­
jective of rational allocation of resources for which all 
policy-makers should strive. Part of the Chicago pres- 
scription, in fact, is that courts, in administering the 
common law of tort and contract, may offer better economic 
policy than do governments and legislatures engaged in 
market-distorting regulation. E2il These considerations raise 
the question whether we should therefore regard the common 
law, in the hands of the courts, as a source of economic 
policy independent of the actions of central government.
The answer is a qualified 'no'. What the restraint 
of trade example and the work of the economic analysts of 
law demonstrate is that the common law has an economic 
content, and that rules of law shape economic relationships. 
As I have already argued, the essentials of the common law 
- rights of personal security and property, for example - 
should be viewed not as part of economic policy itself, 
but as a framework within which that policy is contained




























































































and against which it may react.
Some parts of the common law, however, can be seen 
changing and developing: the restraint of trade doctrine,
already cited, is an obvious example. Here the courts are 
not affirming or reinforcing a fundamental principle but 
are setting the appropriate scope of an exception to such
the ambit of the activity of economic policy. Even here, 
however, the process of change has generally been slow, and 
the courts have echoed policy developments that were occurring 
elsewhere, rather than themselves leading the way. Thus the 
vigour of judicial application of the restraint of trade 
doctrine has waxed, and waned, and waxed again, responding 
first to legislative condemnation of monopolies and combinations 
in Tudor and Stuart times, then, as already noted, to laisser 
faire ideas and the repeal of restrictive legislation, and now 
to the rebuilding of a structure of competition legislation 
since the Second World War. There have, it is true, been time- 
lags in this process, where slowness of judicial adaptation to 
legislative policy has resulted in a distinctive judicial 
attitude, as in relation to combinations of workmen at the 
end of the nineteenth century. [23] There may also be abrupt
changes of direction, as the judiciary attempts to follow, 
in its common law doctrine, the sinuous and ill-marked track 
of executive and legislative policy: a recent example is





























































































afforded by the apparent espousal, by the House of Lords, 
of inequality of bargaining power as a ground for invoking 
the restraint of trade doctrine. [2 4j At such times, perhaps, 
the courts may be regarded as in independent source of economic 
policy; but the scope left by legislation for the development 
of the common law in areas relevant to economic policy ob­
jectives is so small that the courts' importance, in this 
role, is minimal. This is not to say, of course, that their 
importance in relation to economic policy is minimal: their
approach to, and their decisions in, their tasks of inter­
preting, reviewing and enforcing, legal measures of economic 
policy remain matters of central concerns.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS
1. Ouantifiabilitv, aggregation, and modes of action
For Kirschen, it will be recalled, an economic objective 
was a concent which could be given "some quantification". C25l 
Quantification of objectives is both an essential tool of 
processes of economic modelling and forecasting, and a largely 
accurate description of how government assesses its performance 
in the economic sphere. Progress in full employment policy, 
for example, may be measured in terms of the ratio of unemployed 
workers to job vacancies, or of unemployed workers as a per­























































































































































































the motorway network. A difference of degree should however 
be noted. It is usually meaningless to speak of success 
in economic policy otherwise than in quantitative terms, 
whereas in other areas, though there is a continuing search 
for new and more subtle quantitative indicators, there remains 
some recognition that not every aspect of human happiness 
lends itself to numerical measurement. Economic policy, of 
course, addresses precisely those aspects that have this 
quality.
Without too much distortion, therefore, one can 
view economic policy as the attempt, by government, to in­
fluence the movement of certain economic quantities or in­
dicators, whether by restraining movement away from specified 
targets or promoting movement towards them. The means at 
the government's disposal for exercising such influence are 
almost entirely indirect, that is to say, they operate on the 
actions and decisions of persons outside the government, whose 
aggregated results determine the level of tie relevant economic 
indicators. The popular vocabulary of economic management 
does not reflect this quality of indirectness: we speak of
government "creating jobs", "restricting imports", "boosting 
investment", all phrases which suggest the capacity of govern­
ment, of and by itself, to secure the results referred to.
We do not, however, live under the kind of centrally planned 
economy within which the policy-maker has direct control 




























































































scale changes, in, for example, the balance of production 
as between consumer and investment goods. Even in developed 
socialist states such as the USSR and other countries of 
Eastern Europe, the reality of the planned economy is far 
more complex and uncertain than the simple model of plan and 
command would suggest; and in the United Kingdom, as in 
other Western "mixed" economies, it is only in the public 
sector - indeed, only within that part of it directly con­
trolled by central government - that the possibility exists 
of altering the quantities expressive of economic policy ob­
jectives by direct executive decision.
Notwithstanding the present size of the public
sector in the United Kingdom - since 1974 public expenditure
has varied between 40 and 47 per cent of gross domestic
product - {26[ the scope for such direct executive decision
is limited. Central government expenditure, which runs
at about 66-69 per cent of the total, is heavily concentrated 
in the areas of defence and social security, and only a minor
proportion (about 40 per cent) goes on the purchase of goods
and services (including labour), where direct effects may most
readily be produced. [2 7] The rest is spent on subsidies,
grants and loans to individuals, enterprises and other public
authorities. While this 40 per cent is still a tidy sum in
money terms — roughly f25,513m. in 1979-80 - its redeployment
in the extent necessary to produce significant changes in
any major economic aggregate would have major adverse effects
- at least in the short term - on the discharge of public





























































































Unless, therefore, the government is hypocritical 
and its policy is hollow, in the sense that it adopts as an 
objective a quantity which it thinks would occur anyway, 
without intervention (a possibility not to be excluded as 
unthinkable), the setting of a policy objective implies 
setting out to affect the behaviour of others: the "others",
in the public sector no less than in the private, who charge 
prices, pay wages, export and import goods, invest capital, 
borrow and lend money, make take-over bids, purchase goods and 
services. It is their actions which in aggregate or on 
average make up the greatest part of all the quantities which 
government is trying to manipulate; their actions, therefore, 
which must be made different from what they would otherwise, 
in the absence of the policy, have been. More precisely, 
some of those actions, some of that behaviour, must be different 
zero and 100 per cent are not necessarily the only quantities 
that government aims at. A government that wants a rising 
birthrate for economic reasons may not wish every wife to 
bear an extra child. It is important to understand that though 
government is interested only in totals or averages, the re­
levant actions cannot be manipulated in the mass; each 
separate economic actor must be addressed, but only with a view 
to getting a sufficient number to change their course of action 
to satisfy the demands of the policy. Aggregated ends are 
pursued by individualised means.




























































































2. Television imports; a hypothetical case
These propositions may be clarified by a hypothetical 
example. Suppose that an object of governmental concern 
is the viability of the domestic television manufacturing 
industry; that a situation has arisen in which imports 
are capturing an ever-increasing share of the home market. 
Foreign sets are, it appears, more reliable and technically 
more advanced than their home-made counterparts. The 
domestic industry represents to government that given time 
and opportunity to invest in new manufacturing facilities and 
equipment, it could be fully competitive and could recapture 
and retain an adequate market share. The need, therefore, 
is to provide a breathing-space by securing that for a 
certain period, imports of foreign sets are held at the 
current level or, better, reduced by some indefinite amount.
Let us assume that the government, worried about de-industriali­
sation and unemployment generally, accepts this argument for 
temporary protection. It confronts a market in which two 
chains of supply - on the one hand that of foreign manufac­
turers, their importers and distributors, on the other that 
of domestic manufacturers and their distributors - merge at the 
retail level where sets are sold to their ultimate users. Even 
with the specific objective mentioned, this situation offers 





























































































The government may decide to address itself directly 
to those who are exercising choices as between domestic 
and foreign sets, that is to say, consumers and retailers.
It may do this by means of a "Buy British" campaign of 
ministerial speeches and public advertisements; by offering 
a financial inducement to purchase a British set, such as 
a reduced licence fee; by imposing a financial penalty on 
the purchase of a foreign set, such as a point-of-sale tax, 
purchase tax, or discriminatory rate of VAT; or, most force­
fully, by securing legislation to make it an offence to buy, 
or as a retailer to sell, a foreign television set. Alter­
natively it may intervene at an earlier point in the supply 
chain, as by reducing the costs of British sets by a sub­
sidy to manufacturers, or by increasing those of foreign sets 
by an import tariff payable by importers, or by the stipulation 
of unusual manufacturing standards for the British market which 
foreign manufacturers would find it difficult and expensive 
to meet. Finally, the government may aim directly for a re­
duction in supply, by negotiating export restraint with 
foreign manufacturers or with their governments, or by the 
temporary prohibition of imports, or the fixing of an import 
quota.
3. Distinctions between instruments
This example may be used to suggest a variety of distinc­
tions which may be drawn among the instruments available in




























































































relation to a given policy objective.
(i) We can contrast instruments by reference to their con­
nection (or lack of it) with legal norms. A publicity 
campaign, or an "understanding" about export levels, seem 
prima facie to have far less to do with law than do prohi­
bitions and quotas.
(ii) Another point of differentiation is by reference to 
the number of people addressed by each instrument. Generally 
speaking, the further back up the supply chain the government 
goes in search of its point of intervention, the fewer the 
number of individuals whose choices it needs to affect. At 
the level of purchasers of television sets, numbers may be 
counted in thousands; at the level of manufacturers or govern­
ments, on the fingers of the hand. Interventions at this 
level are obviously more convenient in administrative terms 
because of the smaller number of enterprises and transactions 
on which they need to operate, but this convenience may be 
offset by the disadvantage of a lesser degree of certainty as 
to the effects of the instrument. If manufacturers or importers 
decide to absorb themselves the costs of a tariff on imported 
television sets, rather than pass it on to the ultimate purchaser 
in the form of increased prices, the desired effect of reducing 
import penetration may be greatly attenuated. Whatever the 
merits or demerits, from the efficiency point of view, of 
interventions at different points of the supply chain, it should




























































































be obvious that instruments which address large numbers 
of people may call for different techniques, and hence 
different kinds of measures, from those appropriate where 
only small numbers are involved.
(iii) The example also illustrates the point that the 
government may not be aiming to alter all relevant choices. 
Its aim, in this respect, will depend, once more, upon its 
chosen point and method of intervention. If the choice falls 
on a reduced licence fee for all who purchase a British set 
within a given period, the government may be taken not only 
to have accepted the fact that some who buy British and ob­
tain the reduction would have bought British anyway (so 
that the measure's only effect in this respect may have been 
an acceleration of the purchase) but also to have calculated 
that not all who would have bought an imported set will be 
led to change their mind: the aim of the policy is that a
sufficient number should do so. If on the other hand the 
chosen weapon is an import quota, operated by awarding to 
existing importers individual licences for a fixed fraction 
of the quantities previously imported, then it is of the 
essence that every individual addressed should alter his 
import decisions in full accordance with the stipulations
purchased at the cost of administrative complexity and the 
ossification of the market structure, a price which may, or 
may not, be too high.




























































































4. The concept of relative cost : the principle
While these distinctions between instruments are important, 
more important still is the fact that the instruments illus­
trated all operate with the same basic purpose and effect. In 
each case, the aim of government' is to change the behaviour of 
individuals by altering the relative costs of behaviour which 
is, and is not, in accordance with its policy. This may be 
done either by reducing the costs of behaviour in accordance 
with the policy; or by increasing t he costs of behaviour 
which is contrary to it. The costs involved may be money 
costs; but they need not necessarily be so. Quite obviously, 
a discriminatory sales tax will make an imported set relatively 
more costly than its untaxed domestic rival; a discriminatory 
licence fee reduction will make a domestic set less costly to 
own. But a "Buy British" campaign, without any deployment of 
taxes or subsidies, may also make the domestic product re­
latively less costly, in that for the same money the consumer 
now gets not only a television set but also the satisfactions 
of expressing patriotism and solidarity, satisfactions which, 
though not marketable, are nonetheless real and valuable. The 
same analysis may be applied to measures which involve the 
creation of criminal penalties. The relative cost of the im­
ported set whose purchase is prohibited on pain of a fine is 
increased - doubtless in a different amount for each potential 




























































































the costs, financial, psychological and social, of under­
going prosecution, all discounted by reference to the degree 
of probability of detection and prosecution; and to this 
must be added a further increment representing the "moral 
cost" to any particular individual of breaking the law, as 
this affects his personal integrity and self-esteem, as 
opposed to threatening him with external consequences. A 
comparable calculus of costs and benefits is presented to the 
potential importer of foreign sets when faced with an import 
prohibition. He, however, may also take into account, on 
the benefit side of the balance, the increase in the value of 
the imported set, deriving from its scarcity, which may enable 
him to recoup in money the costs associated with risks of 
prosecution.
The value of the idea of relative costs is that it provides 
a unifying framework within which we can discuss a variety of 
instruments of policy which may, as already noted, "invoke the 
law" in different degrees and different ways, or not at all.
It offers us a common point of reference for the analysis and 
comparison of such diverse legal measures as criminal prohibi­
tions, licensing schemes, expenditure legislation and public 
contracts, and may permit us to develop hypotheses to explain, 
within the framework of a given economic order and constitutional- 
legal system, the choice of legal measures in relation to par­
ticular policy objectives and instruments, as well as the 




























































































5. Relative costs: some clarifications
(i) Individuals
When referring in general terms to the relative costs 
concept I have spoken of affecting "individuals'" decisions, 
choices, or behaviour. As the television imports example 
suggests, this term is to be understood as including a wide 
variety of economic actors: not only real people, acting
singly as consumers, employees, and so on, but also enter­
prises, decentralised units of government, even foreign govern­
ments. "Individual", therefore, is used as a shorthand des­
cription for the distinct decision-taking unit whose choices 
government seeks to affect, whatever may be its nature or size, 
and regardless of its legal status. As used here it connotes 
neither the singular physical person nor the incorporated 
legal person: it refers uniquely to the capacity, as a matter
of fact, to take decisions and follow courses of behaviour 
which are of concern to government in relation to its economic 
policy objectives. An unincorporated association that possesses 
this capacity - a trade union, for example - is therefore for 
us an individual, no less than is the consumer purchasing a 
television or the company manufacturing it. Naturally we 
cannot be indifferent to the colossal disparities - of numbers, 
size, wealth, power and organisation - existing as between 
members of this broad class. One object of any legal discussion




























































































of economic policy must be to examine what distinctions have 
been drawn, in the framing and application of legal measures, 
between different types of "individuals", and with what effect.
Nor should we neglect the fact that decision-taking units 
involving more than one person are not monolithic: decisions
are the product of a structure of power within the unit. That 
structure may be highly complex, involving both the aggregation 
of the preferences of individual people into group viewpoints 
of interests, and the balancing of those viewpoints or the 
resolution of conflict between them. Even within a medium­
sized manufacturing company, for example, there are likely 
to exist distinct groups such as shareholders, managers, and 
one or a number of groups of workers (divided by factors such 
as trade union allegiance, possession of skills, mode of re­
muneration) and while each of these groups will have an interest 
in the survival and prosperity of the company they may have 
quite different short-term aims in specific situations such as 
expansion, redundancy or takeover. In relation to many areas 
of policy, and to the use of most kinds of instruments, these 
structures, and the diverse interests they encompass can be 
viewed purely from the standpoint of their decision-taking 
capacity as collective entities, which is their passport to 
"individual" status. In two situations, however, an analysis of 
policy requires investigation of the structure as such. The 
first case is where the power-relations within the decision­




























































































the task of affecting its decisions. Recent British Govern­
ment policy towards the National Coal Board, which has been 
largely conditioned by the acceptability of decisions to the 
Board's employees, affords a good example. The second is 
where the alteration or creation of structures is itself the 
instrument, or an instrument, of government policy. New cor­
porate forms as a support for technological innovation in small 
enterprises, worker participation as an instrument for greater 
productivity though increased industrial harmony, are but two 
possible examples from a rich field. In such cases, however, 
the relevant individuals are those who operate or will operate 
within the structure, whose relative costs are affected by 
the changes proposed in their opportunities or constraints.
(ii) Control and choice
Implicit in the relative costs concept is the idea that 
the individual decision-maker always retains a choice as to 
whether he will align his conduct with the demands of govern­
ment policy, no matter what instrument government deploys. It 
is not difficult to imagine - though much harder actually to 
find - situations in which the physical control and supervision 
exercised by governmental agents is so tight as to eliminate 
even the possibility of non-compliance, so that choice is 
absent and non-compliance beyond price. The rarity of such 
cases, however, serves essentially to emphasise the element 
of choice existing in all normal cases, even in the face of 




























































































because there is a tendency among writers who set out to 
assess the costs and benefits of using different kinds of 
instruments in fields such as pollution policy, to assume 
that people always obey mandatory legal rules. |3oj On this 
basis regulatory standards are argued to be inflexible and 
productive of sub-optimal results, in contrast to "market- 
type" instruments such as taxes, subsidies, or tradeable 
pollution entitlements. These are said to leave sufficient 
discretion to the individual to permit him to adjust his 
activity in a way which is capable of achieving the best 
available balance of compliance costs and policy benefits. 
Behaviour in response to mandatory rules is in fact much 
more complex than this model allows for : in the economic
sphere, at least, calculated and negotiated non-compliance 
are common phenomena, and are based on the same kind of 
cost-benefit analysis as is explicitly demanded by the use of 
"market-type" instruments. [31] There may still be very good 
reasons for preferring, in a given case, a tax-based to a 
regulation-based scheme (for example, greater economic trans­
parency or the reduction of administrative discretion) : but
the evaluation must take account of the individual's "discretion 
to disobey". (32j
Even the use of criminal sanctions to support prohibitions 
does not disrupt the essential unity of the relative cost concept. 
The traditional association of the criminal sanction with moral 
imperatives has been weakened almost to the point of disappear­
ance in the field of economic policy by its frequent use in 
situations which imply no moral stigma, as is indicated by the




























































































fact that governments often interchange economic instruments 
which involve reliance on criminal penalties with others that 
do not - for example, substituting import duties for import 
quotas, and vice versa. In the context of an inquiry into 
the deployment of legal measures in the service of economic 
policy objectives, any residual moral implications attaching 
to criminal prohibitions are important only in so far as they 
affect the processes of choosing and operating legal measures.
It is conceivable that in a particular case the moral implic­
ations associated with the criminal sanction may make a 
criminal measure inappropriate, or, once enacted, may inhibit 
its application; conversely the presence of such a sanction 
may in some cases reinforce the efficacy of a measure by adding 
specific moral costs to detection and c-onviction. The fact 
that the criminal sanction may, in certain applications, possess 
these distinctive qualities in no sense requires its separate 
treatment, but reinforces the need for a common concept to 
which these distinctive qualities, along with those of other 
kinds of measure, may be related.
(iii) Knowledge and experimentation
Government, it may be said, can surely never know the 
individual economic agent's calculation of the costs and 
benefits of a particular decision. In such a state of 
ignorance, can it make sense for government to set out to 
alter such a decision by adding in further costs and benefits 




























































































cases, however, such knowledge is not vital. What is 
important to government is not any specific individual 
decision, but the economic aggregate, the sum total of 
such decisions. It may well not care which individuals 
change their decisions in response to its policy, so long 
as a sufficient number of them do so. Indeed, the policy 
may not even aim at any specified quantitative effect on 
the relevant aggregate, but may simply seek to increase 
or reduce it. In the latter case, the imposition of a tax 
of an arbitrary amount will produce an observable reduction, 
changing the decisions of those agents for whom the cal­
culated benefit from the proposed decision was less than 
the amount of the tax. Assuming that it can get accurate 
information about such aggregate changes, government can 
thaiuse this information to refine its policy and improve 
its powers of predicting the results of future tax changes.
The technique is essentially experimental in character and 
does not depend for its success on knowledge of the decision­
making of individuals. It nonetheless remains the case that 
the measures actually adopted produce their effects through 
the process of altering individual decisions already des­
cribed. To avoid confusion, it is worth reiterating that 
this experimental approach is not the only one which may be 
pursued by government. By intervening at a point, and in a 





























































































ment may put itself in a position to acquire the information 
needed for the refinement of policy by other means, such as 
negotiation, bilateral discussion, and so on. At the same 
time it may seek, as in the example of import quotas, to 
change the behaviour of this smaller number of individuals 
in a more precise way.
6. Choice of instruments : an hypothesis
I said earlier that government may seek to change be­
haviour in two ways : by reducing the costs of behaviour
which is in accordance with its policy; or by increasing 
the costs of behaviour which is contrary to it. These two 
ways of proceeding may come to much the same thing, if the 
individual has before him only two choices which are relevant 
to the policy. Say the government decides to resolve its 
television imports problem by approaching the consumer direct­
ly. Since it is reasonable to suppose that a much higher 
degree of substitutability exists between domestic and im­
ported television sets than between either kind of set and 
other things, government can confine its interest to those 
consumers who are going to buy a television set. These people 
will be confronted with a wide range of choice (colour/black 
and white, large screen/small screen, portable/fixed etc.), 
but their only choice that matters to government is between 
foreign and domestic makes. Q53J There being only, for this 
particular set of consumers, two possible choices, an increase 
in the costs of one is equivalent to a reduction in the costs 





























































































of result by either of the two ways of proceeding (though 
a given cost reduction will not give exactly the same quanti-
choices cannot be reduced to two. If government takes the 
view that the only available solution to the problems of 
British television manufacturers is modernisation of plant 
to secure lower-cost or higher-quality production, and takes 
modernisation as its policy objective, its obvious course is 
to reduce the costs, to manufacturers, of investment programmes 
for modernisation. The alternative is to try to design a 
cost-increasing measure or measures that would bear upon all 
choices as to use of funds alternative to investment for 
modernisation, choices which might range from increased 
dividend payments, through increased wage and salary scales, 
to such sumptuary expenditures as increases in the number of 
executive washrooms or of the Chairman's poules de luxe.
The only measure which would cover and penalise all such 
choices would be a requirement, backed by civil and criminal 
penalties, that certain funds of the manufacturers be applied 
to such investment programmes. This would cost the govern­
ment less, in money terms, than an investment subsidy. The 
adoption of such a measure in normal circumstances is hard 
to imagine, by reason of its incompatibility with prevailing 
ideas about the general relationship between government and 
private individual and corporate property-holders. In
tative result as the same cost increase).





























































































terms of the present analysis, such a choice of instrument 
is, in the United Kingdom, practically (though not legally) 
precluded either because it offends against values engendered 
by the pursuit of non-economic aims, or because it falls 
outside the space set for "process policies" by the national 
economic order, or both. l?4aJ
The examples in the two previous paragraphs suggest 
a general hypothesis which can be tested in any detailed 
review of economic policy implementation. It is this : 
the more precise the policy objectives government sets 
itself, the more likely it is to see an advantage in 




























































































creasing the costs of undesired choices. [35] The more 
precise the objective, the narrower the segment of the range 
of individual choices that are consistent with it, and the 
wider the segment of inconsistent choices. To revert for a 
moment to the first example in this section, if government's 
only preference is for consumers to buy domestic, rather 
than imported television sets, the cost-reducing and the cost- 
increasing approaches may do the job equally well; govern­
ment's main concern may be with the costs - financial, social, 
political, administrative - that it incurs in carrying either 
type of approach into effect. But if government's preference 
is for consumers to buy in substantially larger numbers a 
range of colour sets made by a particular British manufacturer, 
the design of a measure to increase the costs of all available 
alternatives is all but impossible, and a cost-reducing measure 
(for example, a subsidy on each such set) will be preferred.
THE NATURE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS
1. Power-Resources
If government is to change the relative costs attached 
to individual behaviour, it must be in a position to deploy 
certain resources. In this it does not differ from any 
person who seeks to influence the actions of others : that
person, if his attempts are not to be vain, must have avail-




























































































able some store of sanctions and inducements, some source 
of power. The resources that constitute power will vary 
according to the nature of the relationship within which 
that power is to be exercised : power in the family may
be far more multi-faceted than power in national politics.
Tears are a potent weapon between lovers; they have their 
uses in the courtroom; but as the sad case of Lord Lundy 
showed, they melt no hearts in Parliament. Within the
framework of economic policy, we are concerned largely, if 
not exclusively, with impersonal relationships, where people 
interact as representatives of institutions (for example 
civil servants, company executives), or in the performance 
of given functions (for example, judges), or for the purpose 
of private economic interests (for example, consumers and 
retailers). In this context natural affection is of little 
consequence, and the resources we are concerned with are, it 
is suggested, essentially three : force, welath, and respect. [ 
When government forbids the purchase or importation of foreign 
television sets, or taxes their importation or sale, it employs 
(if only by way of threat) force; when it subsidises domestic 
manufacturers or consumers it employs wealth; when it urges 
us to buy British it invokes respect - for itself as the duly 
elected and constituted holder of economic responsibilities. 
There are of course interconnections between these three re­
sources. Particular instruments may rely on an inextricable 





























































































agreements with foreign governments perhaps provide an 
example. In the last resort, the government's possession 
of force is dependent both on its use of wealth to pay its 
soldiers and police and their respect for its authority.
The wealth of government, in turn, stems largely from its 
predecessors' use of force to acquire and subjugate terri­
tory and from its own continuing threat of force in the 
raising of taxation.
These interconnections may be peculiar to government, 
but the possession of these resources, in some form and in 
sane measure, is not. All but the very weakest can deploy 
force in at least some personal interactions, and in the 
economic sphere, such force - or the threat of it - is 
regularly employed by private individuals to affect the 
choices of others. Examples include armed robbery, the 
patrolling of land by armed keepers or guard dogs, and the 
operation of protection rackets. A high degree of sophistic­
ation and systematisation in the employment or private force 
may be attained, as exemplified by the activities of the 
Mafia in Sicily and Southern Italy. The employment of wealth 
by individuals in pursuance of economic objectives is of the 
essence of everyday life : every consumer transaction can be
analysed, both from the viewpoint of the buyer and of the 
seller, as the use of wealth (on one side in the form of money, 





























































































decision of the other party from that of retaining to that 
of transferring what he holds. Bribery and corruption 
exemplify other uses of this resource. Examples of the 
private possession of respect are perhaps harder to find in 
the economic sphere (there must be some form of non-govern­
mental authority that is the subject of respect, such as 
the authority possessed by the church in the moral and 
religious sphere), but we may perhaps see its deployment - 
not always with great effect - in the publication of economic 
forecasts and commentary by private institutions.
2. Private power-resources and the law
The treatment in the legal order to these private re­
sources of power is fairly complex, and varies substantially 
as between one national legal order and another. In the 
United Kingdom, the law closely restricts the private use 
of force, permitting it only for the protection of person 
and property, and then subject to fairly stringent limitations. 
While legitimate private force is therefore exceptional, the 
legitimacy of the deployment of private wealth remains, in the 
United Kingdom, the rule rather than the exception. Certain­
ly, specific limitations on the use of wealth become more 
numerous almost day by day : entire bodies of law with this
function - planning law, environmental law, consumer law - 





























































































hibitions, as of bribery, which attacked different evils. 
Though there amy come a point where this multiplicity of 
singular restrictions combine to cut the heart out of the 
right of property, that point has not yet been reached in 
the United Kingdom : money, or money's worth, still buys
most things somehow. Moreover it is the law which, through 
the institutions of property, contract and inheritance 
stabilises the possession of wealth and enables it to be 
used as a resource. As to respect, this is a resource 
with which the law has always found it hard to grapple, doubt­
less because its working, unlike that of the other resources, 
is seldom manifest to the senses. In pluralist and liber­
tarian societies like that of the United Kingdom, attempts 
at its control by law are, in addition, likely to be contro­
versial insofar as they involve the control of speech and 
opinion.
3. Governmental power-resources and the law 
i) Force
While government must share with private individuals the 
resources of force, wealth and respect, it does not suffer 
the same legal restrictions on their use. Clearly, govern­
ment is in a privileged position when it comes to the lawful 
use of force. Seen as a temporal process, the restriction 
of private force is but the corollary of the development of 





























































































help and private revenge were replaced by public enforcement, 
and private, local, merchant and ecclesiastical jurisdictions 
were all gradually mastered and dismembered by the King's law. 
This was not, however, a process of concentration of un­
fettered physical force. What was being accumulated in the 
King's hands was power subject to law and for the enforcement 
of law, and while the steady destitution of other centres of 
physical force made the King harder and harder to challenge 
on the basis of might, there was present at almost all times 
the conception that his power was to be exercised according 
to right. The determination of what was a right exercise of 
the King's undoubted power was a matter for law. The issue, 
in the legal, constitutional, and physical battles waged 
through the seventeenth century in Britain, was not whether 
there were legal restraints on the King's power - none sought 
to deny that - but whose law was to furnish those restraints, 
who was to make, interpret and apply that law - the King, 
his administration, and its internal courts? or parliament 
and the common law courts? [3 8J
Few will need to be reminded that the result of that 
struggle was a virtually complete victory for the interest 
of Parliament and the common lawyers, as expressed in the 
Revolution Settlement of 1689 and its constitutional documents, 
the Bill of Rights in England and the Claim of Right in Scot­
land. What this signified in terms of the argument here was 
that the wishes of the Crown, so far as they depended for their




























































































sanction on the deployment of force, could no longer be 
made binding on the subject save through the device of 
parliamentary legislation. [39} The King, in the person of 
James I and VI, had been told by the courts as early as 1611 
that he could not impose by proclamation even such sensible 
policies as the restriction of new building in London or the 
prohibition of the making of starch from wheat : for such
regulations to be legally effective they must be embodied in 
Parliamentary legislation. [4oJ This had not prevented fre­
quent recourse to proclamations by later Stuarts, /4l] and 
their vigorous enforcement through the prerogative courts, 
principally the Star Chamber in England and the Privy Council 
in Scotland; but with the disappearance of suchcourts this 
disputed instrument of policy was finally wrested from the 
hands of the Crown. [-42] Today, therefore, legislative 
authority, direct or delegated, is neeeded not only to create 
criminal prohibitions and other legal restrictions on be­
haviour and to impose taxes, [43] but also (since the ultimate 
sanctions of private rights are remedies which rely on public 
enforcement) to alter legal relationships between private in­
dividuals. Remarkably enough, there is still room for dispute, 
three centuries after Parliament purportedly abolished the 
royal suspending and dispensing powers, \a a\ as to whether 
legislative authority is likewise necessary for the relaxation




























































































or systematic non-enforcement, or partial enforcement, of
from this exception, and the preservation of certain limited 
prerogative powers, we may categorically assert, as a
constitutional principle, that policy instruments involving 
the deployment of force by government require legislative 
expression or authorisation.
(ii) Wealth
It is hard to maintain such a clear view when we approach 
the second power-resource in the hands of government, wealth. 
For a start, government, in the United Kingdom as in other 
Western States, enjoys no monopoly of wealth or of its lawful 
use. Even when we look at particular kinds of wealth, at the 
legal regime relating to the possession of particular re­
sources, we find that relatively few are reserved for the ex­
clusive use and enjoyment of the State. With the exception 
of certain minerals - gold and silver, [47] petroleum, [48]
the mineral resources of the continental shelf - most
such reserved resources are closely associated with the 
government's monopoly in the legal use of force : military
equipment is the obvious example. j5o] So long, however, as 
the possession and use of most forms of wealth is considered, 
by a society, to be sufficiently benign to warrant leaving 
such power in private hands, it is unlikely that we shall see 
the kind of determined quest for its control and restriction 
when in the hands of government that characterised the approach 
of seventeenth-century Parliamentarians and lawyers to the 
royal monopoly of force.





























































































At one time we might, indeed, have expected to find 
the possession of vast wealth viewed as a positive attribute 
in a monarch, in so far as it was likely to restrict his resort 
to taxation for the financing of royal activities. If this 
now seems an anachronistic viewpoint, it is because over the 
centuries there has always been a gap - and it has been an 
ever-widening gap - between the costs of the activities 
undertaken by government and the capacity of government to 
defray those costs from the fruits of its "own" wealth. The 
demand of Kings and Governments for aids from the population 
in the form of taxes, intermittent and of varying intensity 
up to the seventeenth century, has been permanent and of in­
creasing insistence ever since. It lies at the root of the 
development of a specialised legal regime to regulate govern­
ment's deployment of its wealth, a regime which, with one
finality from that which, as we have seen, gives expression 
and authorisation to governmental deployment of force.
One of Parliament's main concerns, in the period 
when it was the occasional recipient of requests for aids 
from the Crown, usually for the purpose of defriving the 
costs of military adventures, was to ensure that the funds 
raised by way of the taxation it consented to were in fact 
expended for the purposes for which they had been demanded.




























































































Such a control of the application of the funds might 
reduce, though it could never eliminate, the risk that 
the King would shortly return, pockets empty, with renewed 
requests for the same objectives. Thus there were, in the 
fourteenth century, occasional parliamentary attempts to 
appropriate taxes to defined uses and to secure an accounting 
for expenditure. [52j In the Tudor period Parliament was too 
weak to achieve any success in this direction. As the ex­
penses of government under the Stuarts outran ever further 
the wealth of the Crown, and their defrayment from taxation 
became continuous and generalised, so too did the concern 
of Parliament; the desire to ensure that specific taxes 
were applied to the specified ends became the desire to see 
a regular and provident deployment of the funds raised from 
general taxation. Little progress in this sense was made 
during the Stuart period itself, 5̂3̂  but the attachment of 
appropriations to tax legislation became regular practice after 
1688, and gradually developed into a process of annual appro­
priation to specified purposes of all revenues enjoyed during 
the year, a process which arrived at something like its present 
form by the beginning of the nineteenth century. [5 A] By reason, 
no doubt, of its origins in the earmarking of specific taxes, 
themselves authorised under the forms of legislation, the 
act of appropriation of funds by Parliament has always taken 
legislative form, though there exists no judicial or other 
constitutional declaration, comparable to the Case of Pro- 
clamations, to the effect that government spending must
be covered by such legislative appropriation. 56/ In fact




























































































the practice and procedures of annual legislative appro­
priation are now too well established for the requirement 
to be seriously called in question, though there remains 
ample room for argument on the related question of when 
some permanent and detailed, as opposed to annual and out­
line, legislative authorisation of government expenditures 
is constitutionally requisite. CS7J
While, therefore, we may say that it is today common­
place and normal to find that the deployment of wealth by 
government is authorised in some form by legislation, we 
cannot be as categorical as in relation to the deployment 
of force. Nor can we assume that legislation serves the 
same function in each case. Certainly there is a common 
factor, in that the legislative process secures the civic 
benefits of comprehensive discussion, democratic consent, 
publicity and formal promulgation for governmental measures.
It controls, in short, the deployment by government of its 
power-resources; though in these years of stable Parliamentary 
majorities and comprehensive governmental concern for all 
aspects of public and private welfare, the government so con­
tinuously seeks the enactment of legislation, and obtains it 
with such facility, that this control function is easy to 
forget. But the historical reason for invoking control is 
different in the two cases. Force is seen as dangerous in 
itself, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement of 




























































































oppressive ruler. Wealth, however, with the exception of 
its use to maintain armies, always the subject of a specially
benign, and the purpose of requring legislative consent is 
not to protect the subject against its oppressive use but 
to protect the collective interests of the taxpaying public 
against its improvident use.
analysis of law in relation to policy, is between the dif­
ferent bases of the constitutional requirement to legislate. 
It is not concerned with the reasons for which the government 
may seek to persuade Parliament to pass particular pieces of 
legislation. Often government will have no choice but to 
propose legislation if it wishes to employ given instruments 
of policy, by reason of the operation of the constitutional 
principles which have just been discussed. Where the govern­
ment does have a constitutional choice whether to legislate 
or not (as when it has to decide whether to constitute a new 
public body as a chartered corporation or limited company, 
which will not need legislation, or as a statutory public 
corporation, which will) its decision is more likely to be 
determined by considerations of administrative and political 
convenience, or of the importance of publicity, than by any 
worries about its propensity to act oppressively or improv- 
idently.
strict Parliamentary scrutiny is seen as in principle




























































































Parliament's current perception of the nature of its 
legislative task cannot, of course, change the historical 
bases of that task. When constitutional requirements for 
legislative action were established they represented the 
means of securing a system of checks and balances as between 
the executive government and a Parliament representative of 
the propertied and merchant classes whose common law rights 
(and particularly their rights in property) were most sensitive 
to government action and who were called upon to defray the 
major (and always increasing) part of the expenses of the 
State. But the development of universal suffrage and the 
rise of disciplined mass parties have changed both the cha­
racter of members of the dominant House of Parliament and 
the factors affecting their Parliamentary behaviour. There 
is now a permanent majority of M.P.s for whom the issues 
over which Parliament strove to assert its right of legis­
lative decision are secondary to the question of the effective­
ness of government in working toward its various economic and 
social objectives. Even the minority - mostly on the right 
wing of the Conservative Party - whose political priorities 
are closer to those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
can usually be stifled by the application of party discipline. 
In consequence there is no longer an inherent reluctance to 
legislate in aid of public policy, and the control function 




























































































This weakness of operation, however, while it may have a 
significant impact on the results of the legislative process, 
cannot affect the reasons for which that process is required 
to be invoked.
(iii) Imperium and dominium
The difference in the historical reasons for requiring 
legislative expression of governmental deployment of force on 
the one hand, and wealth on the other, is reflected in 
differences - persisting till the present day - in the style 
and effects of these two kinds of legislation, and in their 
relationship with rules of the common law. Legislation 
relating to force focusses on the individual and the way in 
which his legal situation - his existing legal rights, free­
doms, powers and duties - is to be affected. This applies 
whether the law directly alters that situation, as where a 
new prohibition is imposed or tax levied, or whether, as is 
more common, it confers powers on government, in broad or 
narrow terms, to take action which has such effects. Legis­
lation relating to wealth, in contrast, focusses on the commod­
ity itself : it lays down rules, expressed by reference to
purposes, conditions or quantities, to regulate the disburse­
ment of funds or property by government. While it may confer 
on individuals rights to receive such funds or property in 
accordance with those rules - social security legislation 




























































































sphere of economic policy, normally) do so. [59] In cases 
of the latter type the terms, and even the nature, of the 
transaction through which the deployment of wealth produces 
its effects on the individual may not be specified by the 
legislation at all, the government being left a wide dis­
cretion as to the choice and form of legal means. jj>oJ The 
contrast between these two ways of legislating is presented 
in an extreme form by British financial procedure, which 
splits the tax side of the budget from the spending side.
On the spending side the annual Consolidated Fund (Appropri­
ation) Act simply indicates the amounts which may be spent 
during the financial year by the government, both in aggregate 
and on each specific function. 6̂lj[ On the tax side the 
aggregate sum to be raised is no less important to the govern­
ment s calculations, but the Finance Act says nothing about thi^; it 
concerns itself entirely with the rules as to the incidence 
and amount of tax to be paid by individual persons and on in­
dividual transactions. m
Many other examples could be adduced to illustrate 
the point made here ;— t̂hat the nature of the power that 
government deploys shapes the characteristics of the law 
through which the power is expressed and controlled. The 
distinction between force and wealth as governmental power- 
resources is thus of fundamental legal significance, and 
merits a specific and unambiguous terminology.
The Latin terms imperium and dominium express, in an 





























































































the deployment of force, which is an inherent component 
of rule, and the deployment of wealth or property in 
the hands of the ruler. I therefore use jmperium as a 
generic term to describe those instruments of policy 
which involve the deployment of force by government (re­
calling here that force usually means the threat of 
force); dominium on the other hand describes those 
policy instruments which involve the deployment of wealth 
by government. Imperium-law, therefore, is that body of 
law which authorises and expresses the use of jmperium; 
dominium-law the body of law which authorises and expresses 
the use of dominium. In each case the principal component 
of the category is the body of legislation already re­
ferred to; but it will be convenient to use imperium-law 
to refer also to those few remaining rules of common law - 
principally concerned with emergency prerogatives and with 
police powers - which authorise the use of force by govern­
ment; and to include within dominium-law those legal 
devices of the common law, such as contracts, gifts and 
other transfers, through which the wealth of government 
may be deployed.
Imperium-law and dominium-law are not, it should 
be stressed, comprehensive categories which can be made 
to embrace all law or even all legislation. The case 
above-mentioned in which government has a choice whether 
to legislate or not provides an illustration. What was 
in issue there was the establishment of a corporation, an 
"artificial" legal person. The common law recognised




























































































the utility of this device for the permanent holding of 
collective property, but also recognised its dangers 
in facilitating the constitution of centres of collective 
wealth and power which might rival the authority of the 
King. With certain exceptions based on long usage it 
therefore required an act of State power for the consti-
of satisfying that requirement still subsists in the shape 
of the Royal Charter, but alongside it there exist also 
the possibilities of resorting to an individual act of 
State power in Parliament, for the legislative incorporation 
of a statutory corporation, or to executive incorporation 
under general legislative authority, such as occurs when­
ever a company is registered under the Companies Acts.
Here the law's essential function is to remove a common- 
law disability in regard to the holding and transmission 
of wealth, and it cannot be directly related to the exer­
cise of either dominium or imperium. This is not to 
say that no links exist. This kind of law provides a 
framework for the deployment of wealth in private hands, OK 
and may perform the same function in relation to dominium, 
by constituting the public corporate bodies - local authoor- 
ities, public corporations - through which public wealth 
is to be held or used.
(iv) Respect
Just as imperium-law and dominium-law do not exhaust 
possible legal categories, so too imperium and dominium




























































































do not describe the whole range of power-resources avail­
able to government. Earlier I mentioned respect as 
another power-resource on which government could call.
It is in fact a resource on which government frequently 
draws, particularly when exhorting individuals to accept 
its diagnoses of the economic situation and to follow the 
advice it consequently formulates. It cannot, however, 
be treated in the same systematic way as imperium and 
dominium, because of its at best tenuous relationship
say that no connections can be traced between law and 
respect; one or two examples may indicate their nature. 
Legal rules may have been designed to protect the resource 
of respect possessed by organs of government, either by 
protecting the secrecy of their proceedings or by shielding 
them from criticism. In the United Kingdom rules of the 
first type are, at least on paper, considerably more 
restrictive than those of the second : there is a draconian
(and largely unworkable) Official Secrets Act, but no 
offence of insulting the holder of a public office. C6H 
Legal rules may also be designed to guarantee that the re­
source is not misused : the common law rules regarding
undue influence have this kind of aim. 6̂8̂  Comparable 
legal rules relating specifically to government are hard 
to find, their place perhaps being taken by the operation 
of procedures of political accountability. We may note, 
however, that in several West European states there has
with legal ordering This is not to




























































































been an attempt to guarantee, by the creation of appropriate 
legal structures, the independence and objectivity of public
small step in this direction taken in the United Kingdom 
has been the legal requirement that the Treasury make 
available for public use the model it uses for forecasting
Apart from these particular cases there is the 
general point that respect may reinforce the operation of 
imperium. The State threatens its subjects through imperium- 
law, but in publicly indicating lines of desired or undesired 
conduct it also exhorts them to compliance with its pre­
ferences. Where the threat of the application of force is 
remote or absent (for example, where the administrative 
apparatus for the implementation of the legal rules has not 
been placed in position) the mobilisation of respect may 
be the only function actually served by the law.
4. Legal categories and policy instruments
relate to the earlier development of the argument? I have 
defined economic policy as the activity of pursuing quanti­
tative objectives through the alteration of individual 
choices. This is done by changing the relative costs of
economic forecasting and advisory agencies. The only
the development of the economy.
How do these discussions of legal categories




























































































alternative choices in a way which favours the choices 
which are in line with a given objective. Government has 
available for this purpose resources of force (imperium), 
wealth (dominium) and respect. Dominium and imperium 
are each deployed through law and subject to the control 
of law, and imperium-law and dominium-law have distinct 
characteristics. This is the point reached so far. To 
complete the model of the relationship of law with economic 
policy, the categories of imperium-law and dominium-law 
must be connected with the central activity of economic 
policy, the alteration of individual choice.
Relative costs may be altered, I argued, either 
by reducing the costs of the individual behaviour desired 
by government or by increasing the costs of behaviour 
which government regards as undesirable. Ways of increasing 
costs include taxes, and regulatory instruments like quotas, 
standards and simple prohibitions, whose breach carries 
the threat of fines and physical and other punishments.
These instruments all fall within the category of imperium, 
in so far as they invoke, directly or at one or more removes, 
the resources of force that are at the disposition of govern­
ment. Conversely, the main cost-reducing instrument 
mentioned earlier, the consumer or manufacturer subsidy, 
is an example of dominium, the deployment of the wealth 




























































































between imperium and cost-increasing on the one hand, and 
between dominium and cost-reduction on the other. But 
there also exists, at the same time, an inverted pair of 
relationships, between imperium and cost-reduction and 
between dominium and cost-increase. The creation of an 
exception to a generalised system of regulation or taxation, 
or the relaxation or even withdrawal of such a system, 
reduces, relative to the costs imposed under the general 
or pre-existing system, the costs of engaging in the ex­
cepted or "liberated" behaviour. In like fashion, a 
selective or general discontinuance of a given exercise 
of dominium will increase the relative costs of the erst­
while recipients. Industrialists may be encouraged to 
invest by tax concessions, or relaxation of planning 
controls, as well as by investment grants; they may be 
discouraged from discriminatory labour practices by the 
withdrawal of government contracts no less than by the 
imposition of fines.
CONCLUSIONS
My primary aim in embarking on this analysis has 
been to demonstrate, in a systematic way, the main connections 
between the activity of economic policy and the occurrence 
of legal change. The resulting model of the law-economic 
policy relationship is capable, I hope, of a number of 
practical applications. Here are two possibilities.




























































































1. Understanding constitutional "problems"
When in 1975 the government, with a weak parliamentary 
position, used its power as a major purchaser of goods and 
services to enforce its incomes policy, political and 
academic commentators who disapproved of its action found 
it hard to express their unease more precisely than by 
use of the term "unconstitutional". Systematic
application of the model here presented might make it 
possible to specify with more precision the sources of 
this unease. Careful attention to the objectives of the 
government, for example, would show that they were 
specified with decreasing precision over the period of the 
policy, and that in the last, most controversial period, 
sought only that wage settlements should average 10 per 
cent over the year. Aiming at an average in this way 
implies flexibility (excessively large early settlements 
would mean that later ones would need to be held well 
below 10 per cent) and a case-by-case approach, of the 
sort usually associated with licensing schemes and similar 
regulatory regimes. It is clear that on reviewing the 
instruments available to it for this purpose, government 
found that an equal, if not greater, enforcement effect 
could be achieved by a "negative" employment of dominium, 
through non-allocation of, and restrictive terms in, its 
grants and contracts, as through a conventional employment 
of imperium. This course of action had the additional 
advantage that no specific legislation was necessary, 





























































































historical functions considerably less specific about the 
production of effects on individuals than is imperium-law.
What caused unease and cries of "unconstitutional" was 
the government's exploitation of this discrepancy, partic­
ularly within the framework of a policy which required 
the taking of discriminatory decisions.
This type of application of the model provides 
no "solutions" to constitutional "problems" : but it
may help to organise the debate, by requiring the critics 
to specify the element, or combination of elements, in 
this policy process to which they object, and the 
particular constitutional principles by reference to which 
those objections are raised. Is "negative" dominium 
"unconstitutional" per se? jj ij Are there some "constitutional" 
limitations to the range of instruments on which government 
can theoretically draw, or on the substitutability of 
instruments within that range? Or does the problem really 
stem from the adoption of a constitutionally improper ob­
jective, that is to say, one apt to lead to discriminations 
in treatment dependent only on the timing of the individual 
behaviour addressed? Or is it only the combination of 
these elements in the particular case that is constitutional­
ly problematical? Answers to such questions, in this and 
other cases, should provide the starting point for dis­
cussions of desirable legal or institutional developments




























































































which could better protect constitutional principles 
while respecting, so far as possible, the government's 
economic policy choices.
2. Assessing trends in economic policy
there exists a pattern of change in the deployment of 
economic policy instruments, according to which the 
government is moving from a supportive role and a concern 
with the general conditions of the economy to a 
more directive role, in which it seeks to operate directly 
on the income position of given groups in society. For him 
one legal manifestation of this process is the use of more 
direct and specific, but at the same time more discretionary 
and discriminatory, legal powers. As will be seen, some 
recent events which have been of concern to constitutional 
lawyers - such as the incomes policy experience analysed 
above - also figure in the pattern he oberves. Other 
commentators, looking primarily at different economies 
within Western Europe, use different terms in describing 
trends in the methods of economic policy. For the French 
commercial lawyer Farjat, for example, the important trend 
is one towards concentration in Western capitalist econ­
omies, and the instrumental apparatus of the State is 
changing in response to this phenomenon. Interventions 
can, indeed must, be more individualised because economic
lawyers, by contrast, claiming to perceive a general di-
Winkler argues that
power is concentrated in fewer centres.




























































































minution of the scope and strength of formal legal order­
ing within society, identify a related process which 
they call "neo-corporatist proceduralism". This describes 
a tendency for the State to seek procedural, rather than 
substantive, solutions to economic problems, contenting 
itself with establishing machinery within which conflicting 
economic interests or pressures can be associated in a 
constructive and balanced way, and eschewing the setting 
of specific targets, for whose achievement those interests 
must be somehow subordinated and those pressures controlled
The analysis here put forward is unlikely to 
enable us to choose between such theories. It can, however 
permit their restatement in a common vocabulary through 
which we can appreciate their common and diverse elements. 
Even with such a common vocabulary as is afforded by this 
analysis, such comparisons require caution in that the 
events said to evidence the trends identified occur in 
different countries with different legal systems. There 
seems no reason to suppose, however, that the model here 
presented could not be developed so as to be capable of 
application to the law-economic policy relationship in most 
Western European legal systems. At that stage, even cross­
national comparisons of trends in the legal implementation 
























































































































































































De Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law (3rd 
ed., 1977) at 208. The sentence has disappeared from the 
4th edition (ed., H. Street and R. Brazier, 1981), along 
with discussion of the developments it referred to.
For fuller discussion see Elliott, The Role of Law in 
Central-Local Relations (1981), ch. 1.
Wade (H.R.W.), Administrative Law (4th ed., 1977), at 5.
De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th 
ed., 1980, by J.M. Evans), at 15; Wade, Constitutional 
Fundamentals (1980), at 55-57. For more detail on this 
issue see Ganz, Comment (j 978^ Public Law 333; Ferguson 
and Page, "Pay Restraint: the Legal Constraints," (1978)
128 New L.J. 515.
For a concise and realistic discussion along these lines 
see Peacock, The Economic Analysis of Government and 
Related Themes (1979), ch. 1.
See in particular his On the Theory of Economic Policy 
(1952), and Economic Policy: Principles and Design
(rev.ed., 1967).
E.q.; Lindblom, "Tinbergen on Policy Analysis", (1 953)




























































































8̂~] See, for example, Theil, Economic Forecasts and Policy 
(2nd ed., 1961) and other volumes in the Contributions 
to Economic Analysis series (Amsterdam, North-Holland).
See Kirschen et al., Economic Policy in Our Time (3 vols 
1964); Kirschen, ed., Economic Policies Compared: West 
and East (2 vols., 1974) hereinafter referred to 
respectively as "Kirschen (1964)" and "Kirschen (1974)")
10] The following account is drawn from Kirschen (1964), 
vol. 1, ch. 1, except as otherwise indicated.
Kirschen (1974), vol. at 17.
For general discussion of the specification of economic 
policy objectives see Hutchinson, Positive Economics 
and Policy Objectives (1964), ch. 4.
_13J Some such specific objectives (for example security of 
supply in the field of energy) would apparently be 
treated by Kirschen only as "quasi-objectives" on the 
ground that though pursued by policy-makers, they have 
"no welfare content in themselves": Kirschen (1974),
vol. 1, at 18, 23-26. This distinction is without 





























































































14] For a general discussion see Pütz, "Zur Typologie wirt- 
schafts-politischer Système", (1964) 15 Jahrbuch für
Sozialwissenschaft 131, esp. at 141; and for references 
Schiller, "Wirtschaftspolitik", in Handwdrterbuch der 
Sozialwissenschaften, Vol. XII (1965), at 213-214.
See Robbins, The Theory of Economic Policy in English 
Classical Political Economy (2nd ed., 1978), at 186-194.
Tinbergen, Economic Policy: Principles and Design esp.
at 149, 186; Kirschen (1964), vol. 1, ch. 6 and at 15.
H  No special procedures were constitutionally necessary,
for example, to effect the major programme of nationali­
sation carried through in Britian between 1945 and 1951.
The same conclusion is reached by the British contributors 
to Coombes and Walkland, eds., Parliaments and Economies 
(1980), esp. at 91-95.
U 9J For an account of the common law of restraint of trade 
see Heydon, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine (1971);
Chitty on Contracts (24th ed., 1977), vol. I, paras. 961-1011.
r » i  The "Chicago School" refers to a major tendency in neo­




























































































at the University of Chicago: see Samuels, ed., The
Chicago School of Political Economy (1976), esp. at 
5-7. In its application of economic analysis to legal 
phenomena its chief protagonist is undoubtedly Posner 
whose book, Economic Analysis of Law (2nd ed., 1977), 
and articles, "The Economic Approach to Law", (1975)
53 Texas L. Rev. 757, and "Utilitarianism, Economics 
and Legal Theory",(1979) 8 Jl. of Legal Studies 109, 
provide perhaps the best introductions. The main 
vehicles for the work of the school in the legal field 
are the Journal of Law and Economics and the Journal 
of Legal Studies.
See, e.g., Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2nd ed., 
1977),
I.e., the principle of the legal enforceability of 
private bargains.
See generally Kahn-Freund, in Ginsburg, ed., Law and 
Public Opinion in England in the 20th Century (1 959) , 
at 240-244.
Schroder Music Publishing Co. v. Macaulay /T974/ 1 
W.L.R. 1308; £1974/ 3 All E.R. 616; followed in Clifford 
Davis Management Ltd v. WEA Records Ltd 1 W.L.R. 61
/T9757 1 All E.R. 237, but strongly criticised by 





























































































power: post-Benthamite economics in the House of Lords"
(1976) 26 U. Toronto L.J. 359. The enactment of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 may limit the develop­
ment of this jurisprudence in that, in the important 
fields of exemption clauses, consumer contracts and 
standard form contracts., "it removes the concept of in­
equality of bargaining power from the field of common 
law development to that of statutory interpretation.
Supra, n. 11.
Figures from The Government's Expenditure Plans 1981—
82 to 1983-84 (1981; Cmnd. 8175) Table 1.2.
Ibid., Tables 1.7, 1.8.
Some of the alternatives listed may in practice be ex­
cluded by moral or political considerations, or by 
specific legal obligations, but this is not important 
in relation to the present phase of the argument.
This is, of course, not the only possible form of import 
quota system; alternatively, for example, a global 
quota could be allocated to importers on a first-come, 
first-served basis. While this might lead to some importers 
being able to obtain their whole requirement, and others 





























































































the activities of all importers to ensure that the quota 
was not exceeded.
For an example see Breyer, "Analyzing Regulatory Failure: 
Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform", 
(1979) 92 Harv. L. Rev. 549, at 581: "The very fact
that /taxes/ do not prohibit an activity, or suppress a 
product totally, means that those with special needs 
and willingness to pay may obtain it. Taxes thus lessen 
the risk, present with standard setting, of working 
serious harm in an unknown special case".
For some evidence in a United Kingdom context see Storey, 
"An Economic Appraisal of the Legal and Administrative 
Aspects of Water Pollution Control in England and Wales", 
in O'Riordan and D'Arce, eds., Progress in Resource Manage­
ment and Environmental Planning, vol. 1 (1979), ch. 9.
The phrase, but not the thought, is borrowed from Kadish 
and Kadish, Discretion to Disobey: a Study of Lawful
Departures from Legal Rules (1973).
I assume, in all uses for this example, that the govern­
ment is indifferent to the country of origin of imported 




























































































L34l One would expect a subsidy of i x on each domestic set 
to cause a greater increase in the purchase of domestic 
sets than would a tax of b x on each foreign set, because 
there will be a number of consumers for whom the effect 
of the subsidy is to make them renounce the purchase of 
some quite different good in favour of a domestic set, 
and some for whom the effect of the tax is the purchase, 
not of a domestic set, but of some other good.
£3 4 a] Cf. pp. 10-13 supra.
’351 The fact that an objective is pursued by the use of highly 
specific and detailed measures does not mean that it is 
precise. Standards in such areas as product quality and 
safety, workplace safety, etc., may be specified in exhaustive 
detail, but the objective may be no more precise than 
"accident reduction".
Lord Lundy, who
"... from his earliest years 
Was far too freely moved to tears"
rose to be in turn Secretary for India, the Colonies and
War: but
"... if a Member rose to say 
(as Members do from day to day)
‘Arising out of that reply...
Lord Lundy would begin to cry."
This unstatesmanlike trait provoked a rapid slide from
political favour, terminating in a posting as Governor of
New South Wales. See Belloc, "Lord Lundy" in Roberts, eu.,





























































































[-1 Compare Parsons, The System of Modern Societies (1971),
at 14 (influence, money and power as "generalised symbolic 
modes of social interchange").
3 8] A helpful introduction to these arguments, illustrated
from the cases, is to be found in Keir and Lawson, Cases 
in Constitutional Law (6th ed., 1980), at 69-111.
Though the Bill of Rights did not purport to abolish all 
existing prerogative powers; some common law powers to 
deploy force (e.g. in emergencies) remained: see Att.-Gen.
v De Keyser's Royal Hotel /1920/ A.C. 508; Burmah Oil Co. 
Ltd. v Lord Advocate /Ì 96 5/ A.C. 75.
Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co. Rep. 74.
For an example see Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution (1966) , 
at 502—3.
_42J While the Court of Star Chamber was abolished in 1641, by 
the statute 16 Car. 1, cc. 10, 11, many of its functions 
continued to be exercised in the Privy Council as such (or 
by its Cromwellian equivalent, the Council of State). The 
Scottish Privy Council survived until the Union of 1707.
Parliamentary supremacy in taxation is specifically provided 





























































































Bill of Rights 1689, arts. 1,2.
Recent cases where this issue was raised but not resolved 
include R. v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte 
Blackburn /I 968J 2 Q.B. 108; R. v Customs and Excise 
Commissioners, ex parte Cook 910j 1 W.L.R. 450; Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self- 
Employed and Small Businesses Ltd /1981_/ 2 All E.R. 93 
(H.L.).
Supra, n. 39.
Case of Mines (1567) 1 Plowd. 310, at 315, 316.
Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, s. 1.
Continental Shelf Act 1964, s. 1(1).
Cf. Firearms Act 1968.
Infra, p. 49.
Maitland, Constitutional History of England (1908), at 184.
Specific appropriations were occasionally attached to tax 
statutes, for example in 1624 (aids for the Protectorate) 
and 1665 (prosecution of the Dutch War), but Parliament 
































































































r  ~ r
both Charles II and James II large permanent revenues at 
the beginning of their reigns, which meant that they 
seldom needed to come back for additional sums.
The Appropriation Act first appears in something resembling 
its modern shape in 1748, but strict annual appropriation 
is a later development. 'See generally Chester, The English 
Administrative System 1780-1870 (1981), at 59-61, 185-191.
(1611) 12 Co. Rep. 74.
The statement of Lord Haldane in Auckland Harbour Board v
The King £1924/ A.C. 318, at 336, that
it has been a principle of the British Constitution 
now for more than two centuries ... that no money 
can be taken out of the Consolidated Fund ... 
excepting under a distinct authorisation from 
Parliament itself . . .
approaches nearest to being such a declaration, but is 
arguably obiter, being given in a New Zealand case, and in
any event does not refer to legislative authorisation.
See Beer, Treasury Control (1956), at 51-52n.
For details see Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed.) vol. 8, 
tit. "Constitutional Law", para.977.
Elliott, however, has recently argued that "in certain 
circumstances legal action may compel the disbursement 
of money /voted under the Appropriation Act_7 if the with­
holding of money has the effect of frustrating a statutory



























































































- 1 1 -
purpose" : Appendix 18 to the Minutes of Evidence taken
before the Select Committee on Procedure (Supply), para. 51 
(1880-81) H.C.P. 118-III.
For some examples see, e.g., Industry Act 1972. Ss. 7 
and 8 authorise the granting of "financial assistance" 
to industry which "may be given on any terms and conditions, 
and by any description of investment or lending or 
guarantees, or by making grants" (s. 7(3)). Compare 
Part I and Sch. 1 of the Act, which provide only for the 
making of "grants" and specify, albeit in an incomplete 
way, some elements of the grantor-grantee relationship.
Spending of these amounts may, of course, also be 
regulated by permanent spending legislation of the type 
referred to above.
The example, and the argument, are developed in more 
detail in Daintith, "The Functions of Law in the Field 
of Short-Term Economic Policy" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 62, at 
67-71.
In classical legal usage, "dominium", meaning "ownership", 
may be contrasted with "imperium", meaning "supreme ad­
ministrative power", as in "Omnia rex imperio possidet, 





























































































See Sutton's Hospital Case (1612) 10 Co. Rep. 1a.
In so far as the encouragement of this process is an end 
of government policy (cf. p. supra), this third
type of law is of direct relevance to our theme.
Supra, p.
In Italy this offence carries a penalty of 6 months' to 2 
years' imprisonment: Penal Code, art. 341.
See, in general, Hanbury and Maudsley, Modern Equity 
(10th ed., 1976), at 627-630; and for a recent example, 
Re Srocklehurst, dec' d /1 978J Fam. 14.
For a brief survey see VerLoren van Themaat, Economic Law 
in the Member States in an Economic and Monetary Union: 
Interium Report (1973, Commission of the European Communities 
Competition - Approximation of Legislation Series No. 20), 
at 28-29.
Industry Act 1 975, s. 27 and Sch. . 5.
For general accounts of these events, see references 
supra, n. 4. Among users of the term "unconstitutional" 
were Sir Geoffrey Howe, then Shadow Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, counsel to the John Lewis Partnership (a firm 





























































































Professor Wade, for whom the government's action was "a 
complete repudiation of primary constitutional principle": 
op. cit. supra, n. 4, at 56.
Elliott, supra n. 59, seems to wish to lead us in this 
direction.
"Law State and Economy: The Industry Act 1975 in Context"
(1975) 2 Brit.Jl.Law and Society 103.
Farjat, Droit Economique (2nd ed., 1982), passim.
„75J For a brief statement, with notes to sources, see Teubner, 
"Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law : toward
the reconstruction of a theory of legal evolution" (1982)
16 Law and Society Rev. esp. at . Cf- Unger,
Law in Modern Society (1976), at 192-223 ("The disintegration 
of the rule of law in post-liberal society").
jj7 6j Thanks go to Alan Page, Jacques Pelkmans, Dan Soberman,
Gunther Teubner, Kumaraswamy Velupillai, and Jack Winkler, 
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